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At the end of the last century I examined the emerging jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the Court) on the topic of the promotion of 
democracy.1 My research demonstrated that the Court saw pluralism to be the keystone 
of its conception of democracy: 
As the Court has said many times, there can be no democracy without pluralism. It 
is for that reason that freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 is 
applicable, subject to paragraph 2, not only to “information” or “ideas” that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but 
also to those that offend, shock or disturb…2 
Institutionally, political parties were crucial bodies because of their contribution to, inter 
alia, fostering public debate on matters of general concern. 
Such expression is inconceivable without the participation of a plurality of political 
parties representing the different shades of opinion to be found within a country’s 
population. By relaying this range of opinion, not only within political institutions 
but also- with the help of the media- at all levels of social life, political parties 
make an irreplaceable contribution to political debate, which is at the very core of 
the concept of a democratic society…3 
But it was the Member States that bore the ultimate responsibilities, under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the Convention or the ECHR), to guarantee the 
essential elements of  democracy. 
 Since that time many significant events have taken place in the political lives of 
various Member States, with examples including Georgia’s  “Rose Revolution” of 2003 
when mass public protests about the conduct of parliamentary elections led to the 
ousting of President Eduard Shevardnadze4; Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” in 2004 
where large public demonstrations forced the re-running of the Presidential election and 
the eventual election of Viktor Yushchenko (who had been poisoned during the first 
election campaign)5 and the numerous changes of governments in States belonging to 
the Eurozone who have experienced severe financial crises (including the appointment of 
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an Italian cabinet composed entirely of technocratic, non-politicians6). Alongside these 
momentous events the widening of access to the Court for aggrieved complainants 
introduced, from late 1998, by Protocol 117 has meant that the Court has faced an ever 
expanding range of litigation involving various aspects of democracy. Therefore, I will 
now seek to explore some of the fundamental themes in this new case-law. 
Freedom of expression 
Recent jurisprudence has recognised the crucial role played by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in contributing to the public debate about matters of policy. In 
Tarsasag a Szabadsagjogokert v Hungary8, the applicant association (the Hungarian Civil 
Liberties Union) had the general aim of promoting fundamental rights and one specific 
area of its work concerned drugs policy. In March 2004 a Member of Parliament (MP), 
together with others, lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court seeking the 
review of recent changes to the Criminal Code applying to drugs offences. Subsequently, 
the MP gave a press interview about his complaint. The applicant association requested 
the Constitutional Court to provide the association with access to the complaint. The 
Constitutional Court replied that it could not do so without the approval of the MP. Some 
months later the Constitutional Court delivered a public decision on the lawfulness of the 
amendments  to the Criminal Code which summarised the complaint. Before the 
Strasbourg Court the association contended that it had suffered a breach of Article 10 of 
the ECHR as it had been prevented from receiving information of public interest. 
Furthermore, the association submitted that it played a role analogous to the media in 
facilitating public understanding of politicians’ views on drugs policy. The Chamber, 
unanimously, held that: 
…The function of the press includes the creation of forums for public debate. 
However, the realisation of this function is not limited to the media or professional 
journalists. In the present case, the preparation of the forum of public debate was 
conducted by a non-governmental organisation. The purpose of the applicant’s 
activities can therefore be said to have been an essential element of informed 
public debate. The Court has repeatedly recognised civil society’s important 
contribution to the discussion of public affairs (see, for example, Steel and Morris 
v. the United Kingdom (no. 68416/01, § 89, ECHR 2005-II). The applicant is an 
association involved in human rights litigation with various objectives, including the 
protection of freedom of information. It may therefore be characterised, like the 
press, as a social “watchdog” (see Riolo v. Italy, no. 42211/07, § 63, 17 July 2008; 
Vides Aizsardzības Klubs v. Latvia, no. 57829/00, § 42, 27 May 2004). In these 
circumstances, the Court is satisfied that its activities warrant similar Convention 
protection to that afforded to the press.9 
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Given that the association was engaged “in the legitimate gathering of information on a 
matter of public importance”10 the Chamber found that the Constitutional Court’s 
monopoly of information constituted a form a censorship that interfered with the 
association’s rights under Article 10(1). The government then claimed that interference 
could be justified as being necessary to protect the MP’s rights in accordance with Article 
10(2). The Chamber applied its “careful scrutiny”11 approach to examining interferences 
with the freedom of expression of social watchdogs. 
 
…the Court finds it quite implausible that any reference to the private life of the 
MP, hence to a protected private sphere, could be discerned from his constitutional 
complaint. It is true that he had informed the press that he had lodged the 
complaint, and therefore his opinion on this public matter could, in principle, be 
identified with his person. However, the Court considers that it would be fatal for 
freedom of expression in the sphere of politics if public figures could censor the 
press and public debate in the name of their personality rights, alleging that their 
opinions on public matters are related to their person and therefore constitute 
private data which cannot be disclosed without consent. These considerations 
cannot justify, in the Court’s view, the interference of which complaint is made in 
the present case.12 
Therefore, the Chamber determined that the association had suffered a violation of 
Article 10. 
 The above judgment reveals the Court acknowledging an expanding range of 
organisations and bodies play important roles in formulating and disseminating ideas and 
information on topics of public debate in democratic societies. Whilst the original Court 
had given protection to political parties campaigning on sensitive topics. “It is of the 
essence of democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and 
debated, even those that call into question the way a State is currently organised, 
provided they do not harm democracy itself.”13 The media had been accorded a special 
role, and a commensurate degree of protection, even earlier in the original Court’s case-
law. “Freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering and 
forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders.”14 Now, the 
contemporary Court has granted the same level of protection the media enjoy, under 
Article 10, to NGOs where they are seeking to contribute to public policymaking debates. 
 Another issue for the Court in recent times has been how Article 10 should be 
applied to the display of contentious political symbols. In Vajnai v Hungary15, the 
applicant was the Vice-President of the, registered, left-wing Workers’ Party.  During 
2003, he spoke at a lawful demonstration, held on the spot where a statute of Karl Marx 
had been located during Communist times. Vajnai wore a 5 cm diameter five-pointed red 
star on his jacket. Police officers who were present at the demonstration required him to 
remove the symbol and he complied. Under the Criminal Code it was an offence to 
“exhibit a swastika, an SS-badge, an arrow-cross16, a symbol of the sickle and hammer 
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or a red star, or a symbol depicting any of them”17. He was later convicted, but the 
District Court refrained from imposing a sanction for a probationary period of one year.  
Vajnai appealed to the Regional Court which sought  a preliminary ruling from the Court 
of Justice in Luxembourg. The latter determined that it had no jurisdiction over the 
matter as Vajnai’s circumstance fell outside the scope of Community law. Subsequently, 
the Regional Court confirmed his conviction. 
 Before the Strasbourg Court Vajnai claimed the conviction had interfered with his 
freedom of expression. The government’s first defence was to try and argue his 
application was inadmissible under Article 17 of the ECHR18. In the view of the 
government the red star represented totalitarian notions that were contrary to the 
values of the Convention and displaying the symbol was disdainful towards the victims of 
the former Communist regime. The united Chamber rejected the government’s argument 
because the applicant did not belong to a party with totalitarian goals nor had he 
expressed contempt for the victims of a dictatorial regime. Turning to the substance of 
the applicant’s complaint, the Chamber found that the conviction amounted to an 
interference with Vajnai’s freedom of expression. However, the government submitted 
that it could be justified, under Article 10(2), as being necessary for the prevention of 
disorder and the protection of the rights of others, due to the fear or indignation caused 
to other citizens by the display of totalitarian symbols. The Chamber accepted the 
conviction could be viewed as promoting those legitimate aims. As to whether the 
interference was “necessary in a democratic society” Vajnai contended that the red star 
symbol did not only represent Communist dictatorship. For over a century, he argued, 
the symbol reflected the liberation of workers and socialism. Hungary had been freed 
from the Nazis by Soviet military personnel wearing the symbol. Moreover, Hungary was 
the only Member State that criminalised the public display of the red star. In his view 
this law undermined pluralism and inhibited left-wing politicians from expressing their 
beliefs. The government responded that modern history meant that in Hungary the 
symbol was identified with Communist dictatorships.  
The Chamber held that: 
…there is little scope under Article 10(2) of the Convention for restrictions on 
political speech or on the debate of questions of public interest… In the instant 
case, the applicant’s decision to wear a red star in public must be regarded as his 
way of expressing his political views. The display of vestimentary symbols falls 
within the ambit of Article 10.19 
Furthermore: 
…utmost care must be observed in applying any restrictions, especially when the 
case involves symbols which have multiple meanings. In such situations, the Court 
perceives a risk that a blanket ban on such symbols may also restrict their use in  
contexts in which no restriction would be justified.20 
In the view of the Chamber the red star symbol did not only represent Communist 
totalitarianism but also the international workers’ movement and lawful political parties 
in various Member States. Hence, the circumstances in which the symbol was displayed 
was a crucial factor. In the applicant’s case he was a leader of a registered political party 
speaking at a lawful and peaceful demonstration. Although the Court recognised that 
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victims and their relatives of the “systematic terror”21 used by Communist regimes in 
Europe might consider the display of the red star symbol disrespectful. 
Given the well-known assurances which the Republic of Hungary provided legally, 
morally and materially to the victims of Communism, such emotions cannot be 
regarded as rational fears. In the Court's view, a legal system which applies 
restrictions on human rights in order to satisfy the dictates of public feeling – real 
or imaginary – cannot be regarded as meeting the pressing social needs recognised 
in a democratic society, since that society must remain reasonable in its 
judgement. To hold otherwise would mean that freedom of speech and opinion is 
subjected to the heckler's veto.22 
Therefore, as the applicant had been subject to a criminal sanction for wearing the red 
star symbol the Chamber found that to be a disproportionate interference which 
breached Article 10. 
 The unanimous judgment in Vajnai disclosed the Court extending its well-
established strong protection of political expression to highly sensitive political symbols 
worn in public locations. States will, therefore, face a heavy burden to justify lawful 
restrictions on the display of such symbols, especially where the particular symbol has a 
variety of connotations. An example of a later complaint where the State was able meet 
this burden occurred in Christopher Donaldson v UK23. The applicant was a convicted 
prisoner who was serving his sentence in a segregated wing (for republican prisoners) of 
Maghaberry Prison in Northern Ireland. Prison Orders stated that prisoners in Northern 
Ireland were not allowed to wear emblems when outside their cells (except for wearing 
the shamrock on St. Patrick’s Day and poppies on Remembrance Day as these were 
deemed to be non-political/non-sectarian). The Northern Ireland Equality Commission 
had issued guidance to employers which identified, inter alia, Easter lilies and Orange 
symbols as emblems linked to community conflict in the Province that had the potential 
to cause disharmony amongst persons of a different identity. On Easter Sunday in 2008 
the applicant attached an Easter lily to his outer clothing (to commemorate the Irish 
republicans who were killed or executed during the failed Easter Rising in 1916). A 
prison officer required him to remove the lily and when Donaldson refused he was 
charged with the disciplinary offence of failing to obey a lawful order. He was found 
guilty of the disciplinary offence and given three days’ cellular confinement as 
punishment. Subsequently, Donaldson unsuccessfully sought to challenge the prison 
service policy regarding the wearing of the Easter lily. The Court of Appeal in Northern 
Ireland rejected his challenge finding, in the light of the Equality Commission’s guidance, 
that such conflict  emblems had no place in working environments, which included 
prisons. Furthermore, the applicant had suffered a minimal interference with his freedom 
of expression as he could wear the emblem in his cell. 
 In his complaint to the Court Donaldson alleged that the ban on wearing the 
Easter lily outside his cell violate his freedom to express his political views. Following 
Vajnai the Chamber accepted that the applicant wearing the Easter lily was a form of 
political expression. As to whether the restriction and punishment imposed on the 
applicant was justifiable, under Article 10(2), to prevent disorder in the prison: 
The Court recognises that in the present case the significance of the Easter lily will 
be relevant to any assessment of the necessity of the interference. It notes that in 
Northern Ireland many emblems are not simply an expression of cultural or 
political identity but are also inextricably linked to the conflict and can be viewed as 
threatening and/or discriminatory by those of a different cultural, political or 
religious background. Consequently, the public display of emblems can be 
inherently divisive and has frequently exacerbated existing tensions in Northern 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., para. 57. 
 
22
 Ibid. 
 
23
 No. 56975/09, Decision 25 Jan. 2011. 
 
6 
 
Ireland. Therefore, as cultural and political emblems may have many levels of 
meaning which can only fully be understood by persons with a full understanding of 
their historical background, the Court accepts that Contracting States must enjoy a 
wide margin of appreciation in assessing which emblems could potentially inflame 
existing tensions if displayed publicly.24 
The  Chamber noted the Equality Commission’s guidance regarding the wearing of the 
Easter lily. Furthermore, the Chamber believed, “that in times of conflict, prisons are 
characterised by an acute risk of disorder and emblems which are more likely to be 
considered offensive are also more likely to spark violence and disorder if worn 
publicly.”25 So the applicant’s desire to wear a contentious political emblem in a Northern 
Irish prison could be distinguished from the situation in Vajnai, where there was no risk 
of disorder being provoked by his display of the red star. Also, the interference with the 
applicant’s freedom of expression was limited, as he was not prevented from wearing the 
lily in his cell. The Chamber went on to find that where paramilitary prisoners were 
detained in Northern Irish integrated prisons the ban was proportionate as the prisoners 
routinely came into contact with their opponents and even in segregated prisons there 
were places, like visiting halls, where prisoners from opposing groups met. The 
authorities desire to protect prison service staff from being threatened by conflict 
emblems was another relevant factor. Consequently, a majority26 of the Chamber ruled 
that the minor interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression was a  
proportionate limitation and his application was manifestly ill-founded. 
 Beyond the significance of the decision in Donaldson for seeking to reduce 
tensions within prisons in Northern Ireland, the  ruling of the Chamber is legally 
fascinating because of the wide margin of appreciation granted  to Member States to 
determine which specific emblems should be banned from public display in their 
societies. The Chamber expressly acknowledged the importance of historical knowledge 
when reaching such decisions. In Donaldson the government had been able to invoke the 
expert and impartial guidance from the Equality Commission to underpin the justification 
the restrictions applying to the applicant and other prisoners in Northern Ireland. 
 The public display of a lawful, but contentious, flag was at the heart of the 
complaint in Faber v Hungary27. During May 2007 the Hungarian Socialist Party (“MSZP”) 
organised a demonstration in Budapest to campaign against racism. Members of a right-
wing party (“Jobbik”) held a simultaneous counter-demonstration nearby. During the 
demonstrations the applicant, situated at a place where in the final year of the Second 
World War the Hungarian Arrow Cross regime exterminated many people and only a few 
metres away from the Jobbik demonstration, silently held up an Arpad flag28. At that 
time Hungarian legislation  listed the Arpad flag as one of the country’s historical 
banners, but visually it closely resembled the flag of the Arrow Cross regime. Some of 
the bystanders called the applicant and fellow supporters “fascists” and “arrow-crossers”. 
The police officers on duty at the demonstrations had been ordered not to allow anyone 
to display the Arpad flag within 100 metres of the Socialist Party demonstration. 
Accordingly, officers asked Faber to remove the flag or leave the scene. He refused and 
was arrested. Later he was fined roughly 200 euros by the police for the regulatory 
offence of disobeying police instructions. His appeal to the District Court was rejected as 
that court considered the display of the flag to be offensive. 
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 Faber lodged a complaint at Strasbourg alleging breaches of Article 10 and 11 as 
the Arpad flag was not a prohibited symbol in Hungary. The government responded that 
the display of the flag by the applicant was irritating to other persons and therefore the 
police had acted to prevent disorder and protect the rights of others. The majority of the 
Chamber determined that: 
The applicant’s decision to display that flag in the vicinity of the MSZP 
demonstration must be regarded as his way of expressing – by way of a symbol – 
his political views, namely a disagreement with the ideas of the MSZP 
demonstrators. The display was perceived as the expression of a political opinion 
by the demonstrators, who identified the applicant as being a “fascist”.29 
Following Vajnai where a symbol had various connotations the Court had to closely 
examine the context in which the display occurred. In the assessment of the majority: 
 
The demonstration organised by MSZP was located at a site laden with the fearful 
memory of the extermination of Jews and was intended to combat racism and 
intolerance; the choice of the venue appears to be directly related to the aims of 
the demonstration. However, even assuming that some demonstrators may have 
considered the flag as offensive, shocking, or even “fascist”, for the Court, its mere 
display was not capable of disturbing public order or hampering the exercise of the 
demonstrators’ right to assemble as it was neither intimidating, nor capable of 
inciting to violence by instilling a deep-seated and irrational hatred against 
identifiable persons… The Court stresses that ill feelings or even outrage, in the 
absence of intimidation, cannot represent a pressing social need for the purposes 
of Article 10(2), especially in view of the fact that the flag in question has never 
been outlawed. 
. . . 
The Court does not exclude that the display of a contextually ambiguous symbol at 
the specific site of mass murders may in certain circumstances express 
identification with the perpetrators of those crimes; it is for this reason that even 
otherwise protected expression is not equally permissible in all places and all 
times. In certain countries with a traumatic historical experience comparable to 
that of Hungary, a ban on demonstrations – to be held on a specific day of 
remembrance – which are offensive to the memory of the victims of totalitarianism 
who perished at a given site may be considered to represent a pressing social 
need. The need to protect the rights to honour of the murdered and the piety rights 
of their relatives may necessitate an interference with the right to freedom of 
expression, and it might be legitimate when the particular place and time of the 
otherwise protected expression unequivocally changes the meaning of a certain 
display. Similar considerations apply if the expression, because of its timing and 
place, amounts to the glorification of war crimes, crimes against humanity or 
genocide…  Moreover, where the applicant expresses contempt for the victims of a 
totalitarian regime as such, this may amount – in application of Article 17 of the 
Convention – to an abuse of Convention rights…30 
 
But there was no evidence that the applicant had such impermissible aims. Therefore, 
the majority concluded that he had suffered a violation of  Article 10, read in the light of 
Article 11. 
 Judge Keller reached the opposite conclusion: 
What message (in addition to that already expressed by the Jobbik demonstration) 
other than a racist and fascist one could be conveyed by a flag that is associated in 
public opinion with the 1944/45 Nazi Regime in Hungary and is raised at a place 
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where grave human rights violations were committed during the Second World 
War? In the light of Article 17 of the Convention…, I have serious doubts as to 
whether the expression of such an opinion could attract the protection of the Article 
10. 
. . . 
However, even assuming that the display of the Arpad-striped flag at that very 
place and at the very moment could have expressed a message that falls within the 
ambit of Article 10, I am convinced that it is not for the Court to decide on the 
disputed nature of this historical symbol. The case at hand is a telling example, 
showing that the interpretative meaning of a symbol may vary according to the 
place, the time and the historical context. These elements are best assessed by the 
national authorities. . .31 
So, without expressly referring to Donaldson, Judge Keller favoured the Court deferring 
to domestic determinations of the specific meaning of an ambiguous political symbol 
displayed in a particular context. Judges Popovic and Berro-Lefevre believed that they 
were bound by Vajnai: 
The reasoning which provides ground for such an approach is simple: if a left wing 
political symbol is allowed, irrespective of the consequences that its exposing may 
produce, then a right wing symbol should be allowed as well.32 
 The above cases reveal that the Court has been highly protective of individuals’ 
right to publicly display controversial political symbols. Generally, the Court has only 
been willing to endorse domestic restrictions on the display of such symbols where there 
are strong grounds to believe that either public disorder will be provoked or the display 
is clearly signifying support for anti-Convention values (e.g. endorsing genocide). Where 
the Court needs to develop and clarify its jurisprudence is regarding the breath of the 
margin of appreciation it accords to States to determine the meaning of symbols  that 
have multiple connotations. The approach of the Chamber in Donaldson and Judge Keller 
in Faber has much to favour it as the Strasbourg Court is not well placed to know the 
nuances of particular symbols. The Court should be especially deferential to national 
assessments where they have been made by independent and expert bodies (like the 
Northern Ireland Equality Commission’s view of the Easter lily in Donaldson). 
 A related theme in the Court’s recent case-law has dealt with symbolic activities 
expressing a political view. In Women on Waves and others v Portugal33, the first 
applicant was Dutch foundation and the other two applicants were Portuguese 
associations. All the applicants were engaged in encouraging public debate on 
reproductive rights. In 2004 the first applicant, in response to invitations from the 
Portuguese applicants, chartered a ship and planned to sail into Portuguese territorial 
waters to campaign for the decriminalisation of abortion. Similar events had been 
organised by the first applicant in other European States. However, the Portuguese 
government issued an order, based on national maritime and health laws, banning the 
first applicant’s ship from entering Portuguese territorial waters. A Portuguese warship 
was dispatched to block the first applicant’s ship from entering Portuguese waters. The 
domestic courts rejected the applicants’ claim for judicial review of the government’s 
ban. The Administrative Court ruled that the applicants appeared to be intending to 
provide Portuguese women with access to illegal abortion medicines and procedures. 
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 The Strasbourg Court held that Article 10(1) guaranteed freedom to choose the 
form in which ideas were conveyed and this was particular important for symbolic types 
of protest. The use of the chartered ship was a key aspect of the applicants’ planned 
activities. Whilst the Court also accepted the government’s claims that they had 
intervened in the applicants’ planned events in order to prevent disorder and protect 
health, the Court reiterated that pluralism and tolerance of shocking and disturbing ideas 
were prerequisites for democratic societies. The Court found a lack of convincing 
evidence that the applicants intended to violate Portuguese abortion law and the 
deployment of a warship was a radical act to deter the applicants’ freedom of 
expression. Consequently, the unanimous Chamber concluded that the authorities’ 
interference had been disproportionate and breached Article 10. 
 This was another robust defence of political expression by the Court that applied 
the Convention’s guarantee to the method by which the political message was sought to 
be proclaimed by the campaigners. An equally protective stance was adopted by the 
Court in the later case of Tatar and Faber v Hungary34. The applicants (the second of 
who was also the holder of the Arpad flag/complainant in the case discussed above35) 
held what they described as a “political performance” for 13 minutes outside the national 
Parliament one day in February 2007. During that time the applicants tied a piece of 
rope, with several items of dirty clothing attached to the rope, on the fence surrounding 
the Parliament building. They claimed that the “performance” had the symbolic meaning 
of hanging out the nation’s dirty laundry and was motivated by the political crisis in the 
country. They had advertised the event on their website, but had not invited any 
members of the public to join them. A few journalist turned up for the event and the 
applicants answered the questions put to them by the media representatives. The 
applicants left the event of their own will. Subsequently, the police fined  each applicant 
roughly 250 euros for failing to comply with the legal duty to notify the police of an 
assembly three days in advance of the gathering. The District Court upheld the fine as it 
concluded the applicants had advertised their event so it fell within the notification 
obligation. 
 Before the Strasbourg Court the applicants claimed they had suffered a violation 
of their right to freedom of expression under Article 10, whilst the government argued 
that the case did not concern that right, but involved Article 11 (freedom of assembly). 
In the government’s submission it was justifiable, under Article 11, to require the 
organisers of public assemblies to give advance notification to the authorities so that the 
latter could take appropriate measure to maintain public order. Furthermore, the Council 
of Europe’s expert group, the European Commission for Democracy through Law 
(commonly referred to as the “Venice Commission”), had issued Guidelines on Freedom 
of Peaceful Assembly36 that stated an assembly required at least two persons. However, 
the Chamber (unanimously) ruled that the applicants’ action, “which the applicants 
describe as a “performance”- amounts to a form of political expression.”37 The Chamber 
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disagreed with the government’s characterisation of the event as an assembly. The 
Chamber held that the term “assembly” in Article 11 should be given an autonomous 
meaning, i.e. it was for the Court to define such events. 
The Court considers that, in qualifying a gathering of several people as an 
assembly, regard must be had to the fact that an assembly constitutes a specific 
form of communication of ideas, where the gathering of an indeterminate number 
of persons with the identifiable intention of being part of the communicative 
process can be in itself an intensive expression of an idea. The support for the idea 
in question is being expressed through the very presence of a group of people, 
particularly – as in the present case – at a place accessible to the general public. 
Furthermore, an assembly may serve the exchange of ideas between the speakers 
and the participants, intentionally present, even if they disagree with the 
speakers.38 
In the judgment of the Chamber the applicants had not sought to attract participants to 
their event. The Venice Commission Guidelines could not be read as meaning that every 
expressive action of two individuals constituted an assembly. The Chamber considered 
that the applicants’ “political performance” was aimed at conveying a message via the 
media, rather than gathering people to receive the views of the applicants. Applying the 
Court’s established jurisprudence regarding interferences with political expression,  the 
Chamber found that the sanctions impose on the applicants were not justifiable under 
Article 10(2) and therefore a breach of that Article had occurred. 
 So events in public through which the organisers intend to convey a political 
message will be evaluated by the Court in terms of Article 10, rather than Article 11, 
where the organisers have not sought to attract other persons to join them. Given the 
location of the applicants’ “performance” and the obvious content of the message being 
conveyed by their actions it would be hard to dispute that it amounted to an act of 
political expression. The judgment is also valuable for the Court’s elaboration of the 
meaning of an “assembly” under Article 11. 
 As we have observed above39 the original Court saw the media as having a crucial 
role in providing the public with information and comment about the political life of their 
societies. In a momentous judgment the contemporary Court elaborated the obligations 
arising from Article 10 on Member States to secure coverage of the breadth of political 
views existing within their countries by the audiovisual media. The nine applicants in 
Manole and others v Moldova40, were current or former journalist employed by Teleradio-
Moldova (“TRM”), which in the early years of the present century was a public company 
which dominated radio and television broadcasting in Moldova. The applicants contended 
that from February 2001, when the Communist Party won the general election, the new 
government sought to control TRM’s coverage of political and public life in the country. 
Senior managers at TRM were replaced by supporters of the government, two-thirds of 
news broadcasts were devoted to pro-government reports, opposition politicians were 
denied access to TRM broadcasts and specified topics/words were banned from TRM 
programmes (including the Stalinist regime and “totalitarian regime”). In the submission 
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of the applicants these actions, amounting to an administrative practice, of the 
government violated Article 10. 
 The unanimous Chamber began by repeating the, “fundamental truism: there can 
be no democracy without pluralism.”41 Furthermore, States were not only subject to 
negative duties under Article 10, they were also obliged to take positive measures to 
protect freedom of expression as “the State must be the ultimate guarantor of 
pluralism”.42 In the context of the audiovisual media: 
…the above principles place a duty on the State to ensure, first, that the public has 
access through television and radio to impartial and accurate information and a 
range of opinion and comment, reflecting inter alia the diversity of political outlook 
within the country and, secondly, that journalists and other professionals working 
in the audiovisual media are not prevented from imparting this information and 
comment.43 
The Convention did not require States to establish public service broadcasting networks, 
but where such systems were created: 
…domestic law and practice must guarantee that the system provides a pluralistic 
service. Particularly where private stations are still too weak to offer a genuine 
alternative and the public or State organisation is therefore the sole or the 
dominant broadcaster within a country or region, it is indispensable for the proper 
functioning of democracy that it transmits impartial, independent and balanced 
news, information and comment and in addition provides a forum for public 
discussion in which as broad a spectrum as possible of views and opinions can be 
expressed.44 
The Chamber found that, during the relevant period, TRM’s broadcasts displayed a 
“significant bias” in favour of the government, with “insufficient” coverage of opposition 
parties and a policy of limiting coverage of specified topics. The legislative framework 
regulating TRM failed to provide adequate safeguards against the government controlling 
the broadcaster’s senior personnel and its editorial policy. Therefore, the respondent 
State had not complied with its positive obligations under Article 10. 
 The judgment in Manole represents a major refinement of the obligations upon 
Member States to ensure the public have access to balanced coverage of political issues 
in the most popular forms of the media. Clearly, without such coverage the public are 
unable to effectively exercise their democratic rights as they will be inhibited in their 
comprehension of the benefits and disadvantages of the various programmes offered by 
different political parties. Independent reporting of the actions of government is also 
essential if electoral rights are to be exercised on the basis of accurate assessments of 
the achievements and failings of those currently in office. The events in Manole revealed 
a horrifying abuse of media power by the governing party. 
 A much more divisive issue for the Court has been the restrictions that national 
legislation can place on television and radio political advertising. A Grand Chamber was 
almost evenly split on the application of Article 10 to a general ban of such advertising in 
                                                          
41
 Ibid., para. 95. 
 
42
 Ibid., para. 99. 
 
43
 Ibid., para. 100. 
 
44
 Ibid., para. 101. 
 
12 
 
Animal Defenders International v UK45. The applicant NGO campaigns against the use of 
animals in science, commerce and leisure. In 2005 it sought permission to broadcast a 
paid advertisement on television, showing an animal cage in which a girl in chains 
appears, as part of its campaign “My Mate’s a Primate” (seeking the ending of the 
keeping and exhibiting of primates). In accordance with the Communications Act 2003, 
which prohibits political advertisements (defined widely to encompass, inter alia, adverts 
by political bodies and adverts seeking to alter the law/policies of government) on 
television and radio, the broadcasting authorities refused to transmit the advert. 
Subsequently, the High Court and the House of Lords (unanimously) rejected the 
applicant’s claim for judicial review. The domestic judges noted that Parliament had 
devoted great attention to the effect of Article 10 when it had confirmed the well-
established general ban in 2003. After failing before the domestic courts the applicant 
lodged a complaint at Strasbourg. Subsequently, the Chamber relinquished jurisdiction 
to the Grand Chamber. 
 The dispute between the parties focussed on whether the banning of the advert 
was “necessary in a democratic society”. In the submission of the applicant the 2003 
legislation imposed a disproportionately wide ban that had very negative effects on 
“social advocacy groups” wishing to campaign on public interest issues outside of pre-
election periods. Great reliance was placed on the Chamber judgment in VgT v 
Switzerland46, where the banning of a television advert by another pro-animals NGO was 
found to have violated Article 10. In reply the government contended that Parliament 
had sought to protect the democratic process from being distorted by wealthy 
advertisers and there was no consensus on the regulation of political advertising 
amongst Member States. Furthermore, VgT should either be limited to its own facts or 
not be followed. 
 A bare majority of the Grand Chamber (nine judges) accorded significant weight 
to the “exacting and pertinent reviews”47 undertaken by both the British Parliament and 
courts of the legislative ban on political adverts (which had been in existence for over 
fifty years and had received cross-party endorsement during the enactment of the 2003 
Act). Furthermore, the ban was specifically directed at the most influential/expensive 
forms of media. The majority noted that: 
[s]uch is the lack of consensus in this area that the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe, in considering the issue of paid political advertising in the 
broadcast media in 1999 and 2007, declined to recommend a common position on 
the issue. This lack of consensus also broadens the margin of appreciation to be 
accorded as regards restrictions on public interest expression.48 
Consequently, the majority did not believe that the applicant  had suffered a 
disproportionate restriction of its freedom of expression. 
 In contrast Judges Ziemele, Sajo, Kalaydjiyeva, Vucinic and De Gateon 
emphasised that; “…the prohibition applied to the most protected form of expression 
(public interest speech), by one of the most important actors in the democratic process 
(an NGO) and on one of the most influential media (broadcasting).”49 Interestingly, 
especially given that these dissenters came predominantly from new democracies, they 
concluded: 
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Nothing has been shown in this case to suggest that the state of democracy in the 
United Kingdom requires, by way of a “pressing need”, the wide ban on paid 
“political” advertisements that is in issue here; or that the said democracy is less 
robust than in other States parties to the Convention and cannot afford risk-taking 
with “issue-advertising”. On the contrary, tradition and history force one to assert 
the very opposite.”50 
 In their joint dissent Judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Laffranque criticised the UK’s 
general  ban for failing to take account of the identity of the would-be advertiser or the 
content of the  desired advertisement.  
 The dissenting opinions in Animal Defenders International reflect one of the 
underlying themes in the contemporary Strasbourg jurisprudence on democracy that 
NGOs are now seen as key bodies in the operation of effective democracies. That can 
also be observed in the domestic legislation, which as we have noted, applied to both 
(traditional) political parties and other bodies having a political goal. Given the slim size 
of the majority in the above judgment it may well be that in future years the Court will 
reduce the breadth of the margin of appreciation granted to States regarding limitations 
of political adverts by NGOs, particularly if the consensus amongst Member States shifts 
against complete bans on such advertisements. 
 
 
Freedom of association 
 Just as the original Court adopted a highly protective stance towards the freedom 
of association to be enjoyed by political parties, because of their central importance for 
the proper functioning of democratic societies, with the consequence that States only 
had a “limited margin of appreciation” to justify dissolving these organisations under 
ECHR Article 11(2)51; now the Court has adopted a similar stance towards NGOs. The 
first applicant in Tebieti Muhafize Cemiyyeti (TMC) and Israfilov v Azerbaijan52, was a 
former NGO which campaigned for a cleaner environment in the respondent State. The 
second applicant had been chairman of the first applicant. TMC had acquired legal status 
when it registered with the Ministry of Justice in 1995. During August 2002 the Ministry 
conducted an inspection of TMC and that resulted in a warning letter being sent to TMC 
in which the Ministry stated that the association was in breach of its own charter and 
national legislation by not having held a general assembly of its members. The second 
applicant replied that a general assembly had been held a few weeks previously. In 
response the Ministry sent another warning letter claiming that, inter alia, the general 
assembly had been held in violation of domestic legal requirements (including failure to 
notify all the association’s members). TMC, disputed those assertions, but it did not reply 
to the Ministry. In December 2002 the Ministry applied for the judicial dissolution of TMC 
and the District Court so ordered, after a hearing, finding, inter alia, that TMC had 
breached its own charter and national legal requirements governing the holding of 
general assemblies. Ultimately, the Supreme Court confirmed the dissolution of TMC. 
 The applicants complained to Strasbourg arguing that the dissolution of TMC had 
breached their right to freedom of association guaranteed by Article 11. The united 
Chamber held that: 
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While in the context of Article 11 the Court has often referred to the essential role 
played by political parties in ensuring pluralism and democracy, associations 
formed for other purposes are also important to the proper functioning of 
democracy. For pluralism is also built on the genuine recognition of, and respect 
for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural identities, 
religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socio-economic ideas and concepts. The 
harmonious interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for 
achieving social cohesion. It is only natural that, where a civil society functions in a 
healthy manner, the participation of citizens in the democratic process is to a large 
extent achieved through belonging to associations in which they may integrate with 
each other and pursue common objectives collectively…53 
Consequently, the Chamber utilised exactly the same language as in the Court’s early 
political party dissolution jurisprudence to determine that the respondent State only had 
a “limited margin of appreciation”54 when deciding if it was necessary in a democratic 
society to dissolve TMC to protect the rights/freedoms of others. Whilst the Chamber 
was critical of TMC’s “wanton disregard” of its own charter and national law in failing to 
hold a general assembly for nearly seven years; “[t]he Court sees little justification for 
the Ministry of Justice to interfere with the internal workings of the Association to such 
an extent, especially in the absence of any complaints by Association members 
concerning these matters.”55 Furthermore, the sanction of dissolution was 
disproportionate. “The Court considers that a mere failure to respect certain legal 
requirements on internal management of NGOs cannot be considered such serious 
misconduct as to warrant outright dissolution.”56  Therefore, the Chamber concluded that 
a breach of Article 11 had occurred and  awarded TMC 8,000 euros just satisfaction for 
the non-pecuniary damage the founders and members of the association had suffered 
due to the dissolution of the organisation. 
 Although the judgment in TMC did not refer to Tarsasag57 there is a symmetry in 
the case-law as the Court was taking-account of the roles played by NGOs in 
campaigning on single policy issues (whereas traditional political parties generally offer 
wide manifestos encompassing the full spectrum of governmental responsibilities) and in 
promoting public debate on topics of general interest. Both these activities, which will 
often be combined by particular NGOs, contribute to fostering active and healthy civil 
societies which the Court recognised as essential components in modern democracies. 
Therefore, under both Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR States are required to establish 
strong grounds to justify interfering with the activities of NGOs that are contributing 
towards the enhancement of democracy. 
 An example of where a State was able to justify banning an association because 
the latter’s activities were contrary to the values of the ECHR occurred in Hizb Ut-Tahir 
                                                          
53
 Ibid., para. 53. 
 
54
 Ibid., para. 67. 
 
55
 Ibid., para. 78. 
 
56
 Ibid., para. 82. 
 
57
 Supra n.8. 
 
15 
 
(HU-T) and others v Germany58. The first applicant was an unincorporated association, 
which did not disclose an address to the Court, the second applicant was the 
association’s representative for the proceedings before the Court (he was an Austrian 
national living in Germany) and the other 15 applicants were members/supporters of 
HU-T living in Germany and Romania. HU-T (“Liberation Party”) defines itself as a global 
Islamic political party and/or religious society. It was created in Jerusalem in 1953 and it 
campaigns for the replacement of governments in Muslim countries with an Islamic State 
having the form of a Caliphate. HU-T had been active in Germany from the 1960s and 
about 200 persons were followers of the association at the time of this litigation. In 
January 2003 the German Federal Ministry of the Interior decided to proscribe HU-T 
within that country and confiscate the association’s assets. HU-T’s main activities in 
Germany were the distribution of a quarterly magazine (“Explizit”), brochures and the 
organisation of public events. The Ministry considered that HU-T’s activities were 
contrary to national law because the association campaigned against the principle of 
international understanding and advocated the use of violence to achieve its aims. 
According to the Ministry publications by HU-T, inter alia, denied the right of the State of 
Israel to exist and urged its destruction together with the killing of Jews. In the opinion 
of the Ministry HU-T was neither a political party, as it did not seek to contest elections 
in Germany, nor a religious/philosophical community, as the association did not pursue 
religious objectives. The applicants challenged the Ministry’s decision before the Federal 
Administrative Court. The association submitted that as it was banned in all Arab States 
it had to operate clandestinely and therefore it could not reveal its address. Having 
regard to various publications by HU-T the Administrative Court determined that the 
prohibition of the association by the Ministry was a proportionate response. 
Subsequently, the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept the association’s 
constitutional complaint as HU-T did not have a registered address in Germany. 
 In their complaint at Strasbourg the applicants contended, inter alia, that the 
Ministry’s ban breached their right to freedom of association. The government responded 
that HU-T’s activities amounted to an abuse of Convention rights and thus were not 
protected in accordance with ECHR Article 17. Noting the Administrative Court’s 
judgment and public statements by the second applicant justifying the killing of civilians 
in suicide attacks within Israel (which neither the first or second applicants sought to 
distance themselves from during the Strasbourg proceedings), the Chamber determined 
that: 
…the first applicant attempts to deflect Article 11 of the Convention from its real 
purpose by employing this right for ends which are clearly contrary to the values of 
the Convention, notably the commitment to the peaceful settlement of 
international conflicts and to the sanctity of human life. Consequently, the Court 
finds that, by reason of Article 17 of the Convention, the first applicant may not 
benefit from the protection afforded by Article 11 of the Convention.59 
Therefore, by an undisclosed majority, the Chamber declared the application 
inadmissible. 
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 Presumably the German authorities had not sought to formally dissolve HU-T as it 
was not a legal person nor did it have an identified address in that country. Regarding 
the dissolution of political parties an illuminating study by Dr Olgun Akbulut has revealed 
that the Court has determined a dozen cases since its classic judgment in United  
Communist Party of Turkey60. The Court’s protective attitude towards these 
organisations has resulted in the vast majority of  the cases (nine) ending with a finding 
of a breach of Article 11.61 However, his analysis disclosed that where political parties 
had proven links with terrorist groups or advocated anti-secular policies they were not 
protected by the ECHR. Philosophers have also addressed the question whether it is 
permissible for liberal democratic States to restrict the political rights of anti-liberal 
democratic organisations. Kristian Skagen Ekeli has recently  written that in principle it 
can be justifiable for such organisations to be denied political rights, including the right 
to form political parties, in accordance with arguments based either on “precautionary 
self-defence” or “from the foundation of liberal democratic rights”.62 The first argument 
contends that liberal democratic states: 
…should not place the political means of their own destruction in the hands of those 
who wish to undermine or destroy liberal democratic institutions and repress 
people with competing political doctrines and other conceptions of the good by 
means of the coercive powers of the state or violence. The liberal democratic state 
is not a suicide pact, and it should introduce certain precautionary measures of 
self-defence the aim of which is to sustain a liberal democratic order that respects 
the freedom and equal moral status of persons.63 
The second argument permits the limitation of political rights to groups that use or 
attempt to use these rights in conflict with “the core foundation of liberal democratic 
rights and institutions”.64 Ekeli elaborates the core as including persons being able to 
communicate their political and religious ideas to others and institutional safeguards 
against the oppressive use of governmental powers. However, he considers that “ripe 
democracies”, those with an established constitutional democratic culture65, should 
exercise caution in limiting political rights to these groups. The ECHR enables Member 
States to take such draconian measures, like prohibiting the activities of particular 
groups, but the above case-law confirms that the Court requires convincing evidence 
that the relevant group is a danger to the Convention’s concept of a democratic society. 
So we can detect a parallel between philosophical thought on the preservation of liberal 
democratic states and the Court’s application of Article 11. 
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Right to free elections 
There has been a burgeoning in the case-law involving Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
(hereinafter P1-3) during the present century, much of it driven by complaints regarding 
election processes in the newer democracies.66 However, as we shall examine below, 
some of the most contentious recent judgments of the Court have also involved Member 
States with ripe democratic systems. Indeed, the quantity and complexity of the Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding P1-3 has resulted in the Press Unit issuing a non-exhaustive 
eight page Factsheet on this case-law.67 We shall focus our attention on a selection of 
the contemporary judgments. 
 Regarding complaints about electoral arrangements in the (very) new 
democracies The Georgian Labour Party v Georgia68, is a highly dramatic example. The 
applicant political party made a number of complaints, alleging breaches of P1-3, about 
the conduct of the general election held a few months after the “Rose Revolution” in that 
country. A system of active voter registration was introduced, which required voters to 
check that their names were on electoral rolls and file a petition if they had been 
omitted. A few weeks later, on 28 March 2004, the general election was held.  On 2 April 
2004 the Central Electoral Commission annulled the election results in two areas (in the 
“Ajarian Autonomous Republic”), affecting about 60,000 voters, noting there had been 
complaints of voting irregularities in those areas. The election was to be repeated in 
those areas on the 18 April. But, polling stations did not open in the two areas on that 
day. Nevertheless, on the same day the Central Electoral Commission pronounced the 
result of the general election, reporting that almost 1.5 million votes had been cast 
nationally. The applicant party did not obtain enough votes to win seats in Parliament. 
 At Strasbourg the applicant party contended, inter alia, that the introduction of an 
active voter registration system by the Georgian authorities undermined the practicality 
of P1-3’s guarantee of free elections. The government responded that the new system 
had been introduced to remedy the inaccurate voter lists used for the 2003 election 
which had resulted in massive electoral fraud (and the subsequent “Rose Revolution”). 
The Chamber, unanimously, held that: 
…the proper management of electoral rolls is a pre-condition for a free and fair 
ballot. Permitting all eligible voters to be registered preserves, inter alia, the 
principles of universality and the equality of the vote, and maintains general 
confidence in the State administration of electoral processes. The inaccuracy of 
electoral rolls may, in the eyes of the Court, seriously taint the effectiveness and 
practicability of electoral rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1…69 
The Chamber noted that independent observation of the 2004 general election by the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe reported that the voter lists were 
better than those used in the previous 2003 election. Furthermore, the Court found that 
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other Member States, including the UK, used active systems of voter registration. Given 
the diversity of registration systems in operation across Europe the Member States 
should be accorded “a wide margin of appreciation”70 to select the system for their 
country. When assessing if a breach of P1-3 had occurred the Chamber stressed that 
electoral legislation had to be evaluated in the context of the political history of the 
respondent State.  
The Court consequently considers that the active system of voter registration 
cannot in itself amount to a breach of the applicant party’s right to stand for 
election. Contrary to the applicant party’s allegation, in the particular 
circumstances of the present case, this system proved not to be the cause of the 
problem of ballot fraud but a reasonable attempt to remedy it, whilst not providing 
a perfect solution. 
In the light of the above considerations, the Court concludes that, on balance, 
given the specific circumstances of the political situation in the respondent State, 
there has been no violation of the applicant party’s right to stand for election, as 
understood by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, on account of the introduction on 27 
February 2004 of the new voter registration system.71 
 Regarding the applicant party’s complaint that the exclusion of the two electoral 
districts from the national tally of votes had infringed P1-3, as the voters in those areas 
had been deprived of the right to vote, the government replied that Ajarian “armed 
criminals” had prevented the re-running of the ballot on 18 April 2004. The Chamber 
went on to conclude that the Central Election Commission’s decision, on 2 April 2004, to 
annul the election results in the two districts had not been reached in “a transparent and 
consistent manner”.72 The Commission had failed to provide sufficient reasons for its 
decision nor were there adequate procedural safeguards against an abuse of power by 
the Commission. The Chamber was also critical of the Commission’s “hasty” decision to 
conclude the election counting on 18 April 2004. 
The exclusion of those two districts from the general election process was void of a 
number of rule of law requisites and resulted in a de facto disfranchisement of a 
significant section of the population… 
There has accordingly been a violation of the applicant party’s right to stand for 
election under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the de facto 
disfranchisement of the Khulo and Kobuleti voters.73 
 The above judgment discloses the Court having to apply P1-3 against the 
backdrop of a post-revolutionary general election being held only four months after a 
popular uprising (ignited by a fraudulent general election) in a country where the central 
government did not exercise effective control over all of the national territory. Whilst the 
Court was sensitive to the historical background in which the spring 2004 elections were 
being held it still required the respondent State to guarantee the efficacy of the applicant 
party’s right to stand for office by seeking to secure support from voters in all election 
districts in the country. Jurisprudentially, it is interesting that the Chamber found a 
violation of this right contained in P1-3 (sometimes referred to as the “passive” right 
compared to the “active” right to vote74) as O’Boyle observed that the Court has “been 
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rather cautious” in determining this category of complaints.75 The scale of the 
disenfranchisement, that underpinned the complaint, appeared to be a significant factor 
in the Court finding a breach in The Georgian Labour Party case. 
 An issue that has vexed several Member States with extensive democratic 
histories has been whether/when convicted prisoners can have the right to vote, under 
P1-3, removed from them. As is well-known76 in Hirst v UK (No.2)77, a Grand Chamber 
majority (twelve votes to five) found a breach of this right in respect of the applicant, 
who was at that time serving a discretionary life sentence for manslaughter. UK 
legislation provided that convicted prisoners serving any sentence of imprisonment were 
disqualified from voting (in local, national and European Parliament elections). The 
Grand Chamber reaffirmed that the right to vote is not a privilege and “[i]n the twenty-
first century, the presumption in a democratic State must be in favour of inclusion…”78 In 
the judgment of the majority the domestic legislation: 
…remains a blunt instrument. It strips of their Convention right to vote a significant 
category of persons and it does so in a way which is indiscriminate. The provision 
imposes a blanket restriction on all convicted prisoners in prison. It applies 
automatically to such prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentence and 
irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual 
circumstances. Such a general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally 
important Convention right must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin 
of appreciation, however wide that margin might be, and as being incompatible 
with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.79 
 
But the President of the Court, with the support of his successor and three other judges, 
issued a dissent which forcefully expressed the view that it was not for the Court to 
determine the restrictions on voting rights of prisoners. 
Our own opinion whether persons serving a prison sentence should be allowed to 
vote in general or other elections matters little. Taking into account the sensitive 
political character of this issue, the diversity of the legal systems within the 
Contracting States and the lack of a sufficiently clear basis for such a right in 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, we are not able to accept that it is for the Court to 
impose on national legal systems an obligation either to abolish disenfranchisement 
for prisoners or to allow it only to a very limited extent.80 
 Perhaps encouraged by the lack of unanimity amongst the Grand Chamber judges 
and with a generally hostile domestic media and parliamentary attitude towards the 
enfranchisement of prisoners successive British governments delayed promoting 
amending legislation on prisoners’ voting rights. Five years later a unanimous Chamber, 
against the backdrop of about two and a half thousand UK prisoners having applied to 
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the Court alleging a breach of the right to vote, issued a pilot-judgment against the 
UK.81 In Greens and M.T. v UK82, the Chamber laid down a specific time-frame for the 
government to introduce legislative reforms to secure compliance with P1-3 regarding 
prisoners. The Court did not seek to elaborate what the rules on prisoners’ voting in the 
UK should be, but the judgment in Greens referred to the contemporary case of Frodl v 
Austria83 as authority for the view that now disenfranchisement decisions affecting 
individual prisoners should be made by a judge. 
 A few months later another  united Chamber found a breach of a prisoner’s right 
to vote in Scoppola v Italy (No.3)84. Under Italian legislation offenders sentenced to  
between three to five years imprisonment were disenfranchised for five years whilst 
offenders sentenced to over five years imprisonment were disenfranchised for life. The 
applicant had been convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment 
(later reduced to thirty years imprisonment after he successfully brought a claim at 
Strasbourg relying on Article 6 and 785). The Italian government successfully petitioned 
for the case to be reheard by the Grand Chamber, under ECHR Article 43. Also, the UK 
government joined the proceedings as a third-party intervener (in accordance with ECHR 
Article 36(2)). The former government submitted that the disenfranchisement of 
convicted criminals in Italy was different from that dealt with in Hirst as the removal of 
the right to vote in Italy depended upon the sentences imposed by judgments in criminal 
cases. The UK government, relying on the joint dissent, contended that the judgment of 
the majority in Hirst was wrong and the Court should “revisit its decision”.86 In February 
2011 the House of Commons had voted overwhelmingly (234 votes to 22) against 
reducing the disenfranchisement of prisoners serving sentences of imprisonment. In the 
view of the UK government States had a wide margin of appreciation to regulate the 
right to vote and they could decide which branch of the state (e.g. legislature or 
judiciary) had responsibility for determining prisoners’ voting rights. Furthermore, 
referring to Frodl, the UK government  argued that P1-3 did not require courts to make 
individual decisions on the disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners. 
 The Grand Chamber rejected the UK’s plea for the majority judgment in Hirst to 
be overruled. 
It does not appear, however, that anything has occurred or changed at the 
European and Convention levels since the Hirst (no. 2) judgment that might lend 
support to the suggestion that the principles set forth in that case should be re-
examined. On the contrary, analysis of the relevant international and European 
documents… and comparative-law information… reveals the opposite trend, if 
anything – towards fewer restrictions on convicted prisoners’ voting rights. 
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96. The Court accordingly reaffirms the principles set out by the Grand Chamber in 
the Hirst judgment… in particular the fact that when disenfranchisement affects a 
group of people generally, automatically and indiscriminately, based solely on the 
fact that they are serving a prison sentence, irrespective of the length of the 
sentence and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their 
individual circumstances, it is not compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1...87 
However, the Grand Chamber did accept the UK government’s criticism of Frodl.  
That reasoning takes a broad view of the principles set out in Hirst, which the 
Grand Chamber does not fully share. The Grand Chamber points out that the Hirst 
judgment makes no explicit mention of the intervention of a judge among the 
essential criteria for determining the proportionality of a disenfranchisement 
measure. The relevant criteria relate solely to whether the measure is applicable 
generally, automatically and indiscriminately within the meaning indicated by the 
Court … While the intervention of a judge is in principle likely to guarantee the 
proportionality of restrictions on prisoners’ voting rights, such restrictions will not 
necessarily be automatic, general and indiscriminate simply because they were not 
ordered by a judge. Indeed, the circumstances in which the right to vote is 
forfeited may be detailed in the law, making its application conditional on such 
factors as the nature or the gravity of the offence committed.88 
Noting the variety of approaches to the impositions of restrictions on prisoners’ voting in 
the 24 Member States that provided for such limitations, the Grand Chamber held that it 
was for States, having regard to their own constitutional traditions, to decide if these 
restrictions were to be determined by legislation or courts. But, whichever method was 
adopted by States, the Court would have to determine if the right to vote, guaranteed by 
P1-3, had been infringed when an admissible complaint was brought before it. 
 In respect of Scoppola’s complaint the Grand Chamber, subject to one dissent, 
found no breach of his right to vote. In the judgment of the Grand Chamber the Italian 
legal rules governing the deprivation of voting rights demonstrated that 
disenfranchisement took account of individual factors, including the seriousness of the 
offence and the behaviour of the offender. 
 On the same day as the delivery of the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Scoppola 
(No.3), the Registrar of the Court issued an unusual Press Release on the implications of 
that ruling.89 This noted that the UK had six months to comply with the pilot-judgment 
timetable for introducing measures to reform the general disenfranchisement of serving 
prisoners.90 
 The above cases demonstrate the Court’s generally robust protection of the 
implied (active) right to vote embodied within P1-3 for an unpopular category of 
persons. Nevertheless, the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Scoppola (No.3) reveals that 
the highest judicial authority at Strasbourg accepted that the Chamber in Frodl had gone 
too far in holding (legislating?) that individual disenfranchisement decisions concerning 
prisoners had to be made by judges. Whilst it is now clear that the Court will not accept 
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the general disenfranchisement of all serving prisoners91, States still have considerable 
freedom to curtail the voting rights of convicted persons. Indeed as Judge Thor 
Bjorgvinsson pointed out in his dissent in Scoppola (No.3) the Italian disenfranchisement 
rules, upheld by the majority of the Grand Chamber, were more extensive in part than 
the UK’s general ban on voting by serving prisoners (for example in Italy the ban on 
voting could extend beyond an offenders release from prison- up to a lifetime’s 
disenfranchisement). For instance, since his release on licence Hirst has regained his full 
voting rights. 
 The Court has required an individual judicial decision be taken in respect of the 
disenfranchisement of persons suffering from mental disabilities. In Alajos Kiss v 
Hungary92, the applicant was a 56- year-old who had been diagnosed with manic 
depression in 1991. During 2005 he was placed under partial guardianship. The 
Hungarian Constitution removed the right to vote from all persons placed under total or 
partial guardianship. Before the Court the government argued that States have a wide 
margin of appreciation to regulate the right to vote and the measure imposed on the 
applicant was designed to ensure that only persons who were capable of evaluating their 
decisions should be allowed to participate in public affairs. The applicant responded that 
States ought to be accorded a narrower margin of appreciation regarding restrictions on 
the voting rights of people with disabilities and the Hungarian disenfranchisement of all 
those subject to guardianship orders affected 0.75% of the electorate. 
 A united Chamber held that: 
The Court cannot accept, however, that an absolute bar on voting by any person 
under partial guardianship, irrespective of his or her actual faculties, falls within an 
acceptable margin of appreciation. Indeed, while the Court reiterates that this 
margin of appreciation is wide, it is not all-embracing (Hirst v. the United Kingdom 
(no. 2, § 82). In addition, if a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a 
particularly vulnerable group in society, who have suffered considerable 
discrimination in the past, such as the mentally disabled, then the State's margin 
of appreciation is substantially narrower and it must have very weighty reasons for 
the restrictions in question… 
The Court therefore concludes that an indiscriminate removal of voting rights, 
without an individualised judicial evaluation and solely based on a mental disability 
necessitating partial guardianship, cannot be considered compatible with the 
legitimate grounds for restricting the right to vote.93 
As this had not occurred in the disenfranchisement of the applicant he had suffered a 
violation of P1-3 and the Chamber awarded him 3,000 euros as compensation for his 
non-pecuniary damage. 
 The Chamber’s ruling in Kiss can be distinguished from the prisoners’ voting 
cases discussed previously, because, inter alia, it is impossible for the legislature to 
specify which particular members of the electorate should be disenfranchised due to 
their mental disabilities. Such decisions require an independent assessment of the facts 
of each elector’s ability to comprehend her/his power to vote. Whereas, Scoppola (No.3) 
showed how the legislature could determine that certain categories of prisoners (e.g. 
those sentenced to three years’ imprisonment) thereby forfeited their right to vote for 
defined periods of time due to the seriousness of their offending. More generally, R. 
O’Connell has argued that the Court needs to be “attentive” to the difficulties faced by 
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minorities, including the physically and mentally disabled, if the Convention’s “vision of 
an “effective political democracy”” is to be achieved.94 
 In recent times the Grand Chamber has been cautious about imposing 
contentious electoral obligations on Member States where there is no clear consensus in 
the practice of States. The applicants in Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v Greece95, 
were Greek citizens employed as officials of the Council of Europe and resident in 
Strasbourg. They applied to the Greek Ambassador in France to be permitted to vote, in 
France, in the Greek general election to be held on 17 September 2007. The Ambassador 
replied that statutory rules governing expatriate voting did not exist and therefore it was 
not possible for the applicants to vote in France. Subsequently the applicants complained 
to the Court alleging a breach of their right to vote under P1-3. A Chamber upheld their 
complaint, by five votes to two.96 The government then successfully applied for the case 
to be referred to the Grand Chamber. Before the latter body the applicants repeated 
their contention that the Greek Parliament’s failure, for over 35 years, to enact 
legislation regulating overseas voting by expatriate citizens constituted a breach of P1-3. 
The government responded, inter alia, that the Greek constitution provided the option 
for Parliament to legislate on expatriate voting rights and this was a “delicate political 
issue”, demonstrated by the failure of a government Bill on the matter to gain 
parliamentary approval in 2009. The significant size of the expatriate Greek citizenry 
(about 3.7 million persons) compared to the resident population (11 million) meant that 
it was necessary to secure agreement amongst the Greek political parties as to 
expatriate voting arrangements. Therefore, granting such rights should fall within the 
margin of appreciation  of Member States. 
 The Grand Chamber noted that both the Parliamentary Assembly97 and the Venice 
Commission98 had encouraged States to facilitate voting by expatriates. But, whilst the 
majority of Member States allowed such voting, their arrangements varied greatly. 
Consequently, the Grand Chamber held that, “…none of the legal instruments examined 
above forms a basis for concluding that, as the law currently stands, States are under an 
obligation to enable citizens living abroad to exercise the right to vote.”99 Therefore, it 
was not for the Court to determine the manner in which the Greek Parliament gave 
effect to the Constitution’s authorisation of legislation permitting expatriate voting. Nor 
did the Grand Chamber find that the applicants had been placed under a 
disproportionate burden in having to travel from Strasbourg to Greece if they had 
exercised their right to vote in the general election. Unanimously the Grand Chamber 
determined that no breach of P1-3 had occurred. 
 Given the absence of a clear European consensus on expatriate voting rights and 
mechanisms, combined with the divisive nature of the issue within the Greek political 
system the restraint of the Grand Chamber in the above judgment can be commended. 
The unsuccessful attempt by the government to secure legislation regulating expatriate 
                                                          
94
 R. O’Connell, “Realising political equality: The ECtHR and positive obligations in a democracy”, 61(3) (2010) 
NILQ 263, p. 279. 
 
95
 No. 42202/07, 15 Mar. 2012. 
 
 
96
 Judgment of 8 Jul. 2010. For criticism of the majority’s reasoning see, M. Ioannidis, “The ECtHR, National 
Constitutional Law, and the Limits of  Democracy: Sitaropoulos and Others v Greece”, 17 Eur. Pub. L.  661 
(2011). 
 
97
 Resolution 1459 (2005). 
 
98
 Study no. 580/2010. 
 
99
 Supra n.95 para. 75. 
 
24 
 
voting in 2009 highlighted that the national authorities were not ignoring this 
controversial matter.  
 
Conclusions 
We have learnt from the cases analysed in this study that the modern Court has 
confirmed the original Court’s emphasis upon pluralism as being at the heart of the 
concept of democracy embedded within the ECHR. However, the recent jurisprudence 
also discloses that the Court has extended the established case-law to embrace newer 
forms of political expression, like the “political performance” aimed at media coverage 
via the web, rather than traditional public meetings, that the applicants in Tatar and 
Faber had organised. Furthermore, the Court has recognised, and endorsed, the 
important role that NGOs can play in facilitating, inter alia, public policy debate and 
formulation in democratic societies, see for example Tarsasag. The responsibilities of 
States to promote and safeguard the audiovisual media’s accurate coverage of the 
breadth of views on political matters within their societies, has been elaborated in the 
contemporary jurisprudence. Manole clearly demonstrates that a free and diverse mass 
media, which is a pre-requisite for the proper functioning of democratic societies, not 
only requires restraints on the abuse of governmental powers but also positive actions 
by public bodies (such as the enactment of legislative frameworks that guarantee 
impartial coverage of political news by television and radio broadcasting networks). 
 There are still areas of the Court’s jurisprudence concerning democratic issues 
that need clarification. An example being the breadth of the margin of appreciation the 
Court should accord to domestic authorities when determining the meaning and impact 
of controversial political symbols. The Grand Chamber ought to provide an authoritative 
ruling on this topic and, as we have discussed earlier, there are good reasons for the 
Court deferring to domestic determinations where they have been made by independent 
and expert authorities. 
 When developing its case-law on the promotion of democracy the Court quite 
often has regard to the views of other Council of Europe institutions. Two bodies whose 
opinions are regularly considered by the Court, for example in Sitaropoulos and 
Giakoumopoulos, are the Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice Commission. In his 
study on P1-3 Sergey Golubok observed that the Court appeared to be more receptive to 
the views of the latter organisation.100 He speculated that it could be the absence of a 
“political agenda” by the independent legal experts, who constitute the Venice 
Commission, that gives its views such persuasive authority in the reasoning of the Court.  
It may well lead to the Venice Commission insofar as cases on Article 3 of the 
Protocol are concerned becoming the body equivalent to the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment o[r] 
Punishment (CPT) whose opinions are always very influential in so far as cases on 
Article 3 of the Convention are concerned.101 
By having regard to the views of other relevant European bodies and the extent to which 
there is a European consensus102 on the point in issue, for example concerning 
restrictions on political advertising in Animal Defenders International, the Court can 
refine its democracy jurisprudence without being justifiable accused of impermissible 
law-making. 
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 Beyond Europe the Court’s extensive jurisprudence on the promotion of 
democracy offers fertile ground for the on-going debate amongst public international law 
scholars as to the existence/extent of a right under international law to democratic 
governance. Tom Franck initiated that debate in 1992103 and it is still being rigorously 
conducted.104 The Court’s judgments on topics ranging from symbolic protests by pro-
abortion campaigners (Women on Waves) to active voter-registration systems (The 
Georgian Labour Party) reflect how an international court can seek to enhance 
democracy across a large group of States with widely differing constitutional histories 
during the last half century, including fascist dictatorships (Spain, Portugal), military 
regimes (Greece, Turkey) and totalitarian communist regimes (Russia and the former 
Soviet bloc States). 
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